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Insurance reform was supposed to be the easy part. It has not
worked out that way.
I.

HAVING IT ALL: INSURANCE REFORM, DELIVERY SYSTEM
REFORM, AND PUBLIC HEALTH REFORM

It may have taken several decades for the stars to align, but
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) in early 2010 universalized (or nearly so) access to health
insurance in the United States.1 Several factors accounted for the
ACA’s passage. The Democratic Party controlled both the White
House and Congress, with a filibuster-proof margin in the Senate
(at least for the initial vote).2 The Act’s policy design, an
individual mandate with decentralized funding and purchasing,
drew ideologically on a longstanding proposal from a
conservative think-tank and experientially on the Clinton
Administration’s deadly encounter in 1994 with the “tax-andspend” consequences of federal fiscal accounting rules.3 Most
importantly, the suddenness and depth of the financial crisis in
the late 2000s not only excused greater government involvement
but also justified an infusion of federal funding sufficient to offset
fears of redistributive losses and pay off key interest groups.
Enabled by these forces, the ACA solves on paper the twin
problems that had long afflicted America’s self-consciously
nongovernmental health insurance system: that many
individuals with substantial health care needs were deemed
uninsurable by private carriers, and that a larger number of

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITTANICA
ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1673534/PatientProtection-and-Affordable-Care-Act-PPACA (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
3. Conor Friedersdorf, Did a Conservative Think Tank Really Invent the Individual
Mandate?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/10/
did-a-conservative-think-tank-really-invent-the-individual-mandate/247124/; see also A
Detailed Timeline of the Healthcare Debate Portrayed in “The System,” PBS NEWSHOUR,
http://archive.is/vLiz (cached Sept. 7, 2012) (summarizing successful Republican efforts to
quash Clinton’s 1994 health care reform bill).
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perfectly insurable individuals could not afford insurance.
Protected by the individual mandate from adverse selection and
tempted by new customers supported by federal tax subsidies for
lower-wage workers, the health insurance industry watched the
federal government wave its magic wand of nondiscrimination
and declare the sick and impaired to be insurable. At the same
time, the ACA poured even more dollars into expanding Medicaid
coverage, almost entirely at federal expense, to all poor citizens
and legal residents wherever located, replacing more restrictive
and variable state-based criteria for designating the poor to be
deserving of public assistance.4
But the ACA did not stop there. Titles I and II of the tensection Act expand health insurance coverage.5 Title III, called
“Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care,” is about
medical services and products rather than insurance, which is
commonly if inelegantly termed “delivery system reform” by
health policy experts.6 The link between health insurance and
health care is substantial, but the two are not coterminous.
Insured individuals receive more, more timely, and more
expensive care than uninsured individuals.7 However, both
groups frequently suffer inadequate, ineffective, or unsafe
treatment, and the incremental benefits of health insurance to
health care outcomes (both mortality and quality of life) remain
challenging to quantify.8 With over 15% of its population
uninsured, moreover (pending full implementation of the ACA),
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII) (2012) (providing new eligibility
requirements for Medicaid); id. § 1396a(k) (requiring that individuals who meet the
eligibility requirements receive a minimum level of coverage); id. § 1396d(y)(1)
(explaining how much of the Medicaid expansion is at federal expense); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-821, MEDICAID EXPANSION: STATES’
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PATENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1–3, 6–7 (2012)
(discussing the new eligibility requirements for Medicaid under the ACA).
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tits. I–II, 124
Stat. 119, 130–353 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 30, and 42
U.S.C.).
6. See Michael E. Porter, A Strategy for Health Care Reform—Toward a ValueBased System, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 109, 110–11 (2009) (“Although most U.S. health care
reform efforts have focused on coverage, the far bigger long-term driver of success will
come from restructuring the delivery system.”).
7. See The Uninsured: A Primer—Key Facts About Health Insurance on the Eve of
Coverage Expansions, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-a-primer-2013-4-how-does-lack-of-insuranceaffect-access-to-health-care/.
8. Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment—Effects of Medicaid on
Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1717–21 (2013); see also Bernard Black et
al., The Effect of Health Insurance on Near-Elderly Health and Mortality 21–24 (Nw.
Univ. Law Sch., Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-09, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103669 (presenting findings that health insurance neither
significantly increases nor decreases health outcomes).
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the United States spends nearly twice as much per capita on
health care as any other nation, and there is little if any evidence
that U.S. health care is superior in quality to countries that
spend far less.9 According to recent estimates, roughly $1 trillion
is wasted each year on health care in the United States.10
Title IV of the ACA is called “Prevention of Chronic
Disease and Improving Public Health.”11 Its focus is neither
health insurance nor health care delivery, but underlying
health. Whether at the individual or the population level,
health care is not the major determinant of health.12
Notwithstanding sharp, recent drops in tobacco use, the
United States is notably unhealthy among developed
countries, a fact borne out by its global rankings in basic
indicators such as life expectancy at birth and infant
mortality.13 America’s commitment to medical technology and
heroic intervention pays dividends, though at considerable
social expense, for individuals whose genes, behaviors, and
socioeconomic circumstances have made them likely to reach
advanced ages. For the broader population, however, chronic
disease and associated impairment continue to increase, linked
primarily to unhealthy lifestyles.14 In 1985, adult obesity rates
were under 15% in every state reporting data to the federal

9. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2012, at 22–25 (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60245.pdf; see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2013:
OECD INDICATORS 24–25, 64–65, 88–89, 155–56 (2013) [hereinafter HEALTH AT A
GLANCE],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance2013.pdf (observing that despite the higher expenses, the United States has fewer doctors
and hospital beds per person, and a shorter life expectancy at birth, than the OECD
average).
10. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO
CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 13–14 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013);
Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307
JAMA 1513, 1514 (2012).
11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. IV, 124
Stat. 119, 538–88 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 29, and 42
U.S.C.).
12. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (Richard
Wilkinson & Michael Marmot eds., 2d ed. 2003) (arguing that a person’s place in the
social gradient has a major impact on lifelong health).
13. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., U.S. HEALTH
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES, POORER HEALTH 26, 60 (Steven H.
Woolf & Laudan Aron eds., 2013); HEALTH AT A GLANCE, supra note 9, at 24, 25 fig.1.1.1,
36, 37 fig.1.7.1; Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Y. Aron, The US Health Disadvantage Relative
to Other High-Income Countries, 309 JAMA 771, 771–72 (2013).
14. The
Facts
About
Rising
Health
Care
Costs,
AETNA,
http://www.aetna.com/health-reform-connection/aetnas-vision/facts-about-costs.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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Centers for Disease Control; in 2010, adult obesity rates in
every state were over 20%, and in several states topped 30%.15
The ACA’s true breakthrough—and its arguable overreach—
is not its attempt to universalize health insurance, but its
unprecedented goals of also making medical care better and more
efficient and of improving underlying health.16 This seemingly
extraordinary ambition has a legitimate health policy pedigree.
The nonprofit Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), a
pioneer in the quality and safety of medicine, describes the goals
of changing health care as a “‘Triple Aim’: Improving the patient
experience of care (including quality and satisfaction), improving
the health of populations, and reducing the per capita cost.”17
Moreover, IHI regards the three aims as mutually compatible
and, given the current state of U.S. health care, eminently
achievable.18
But these goals are still very difficult to accomplish in a
single federal law. Unlike Titles I and II, there is no simple
summary one can offer of the ACA’s strategies for delivery
system reform or population health improvement, or even
metaphors to encapsulate them. Beyond the magic wand of
insurability for the sick and disabled, beyond the mountains of
money to make insurance affordable for those of limited means,
images of solutions to suboptimal care and poor health offered by
Titles III and IV are much harder to conjure than images of the
problems that those parts of the ACA seek to address. A useful
image for Title III is a ballpoint pen, symbolizing the wellintentioned but uncoordinated and cost-insensitive manner in
which American physicians “order” nearly $2 trillion of medical

15. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, OBESITY TRENDS AMONG U.S.
ADULTS BETWEEN 1985 AND 2010, available at http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/downloads/
obesity_trends_2010.pdf; see J. Michael McGinnis & William Foege, Actual Causes of
Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207 (1993) (quantifying the behavioral factors
responsible for clinical conditions that cause mortality).
16. See Barbara Peck, Unprecedented Impact: Examining the Affordable Care Act,
ALL RISE, Winter 2014, at 40, 42 (observing the ACA’s goals of improving affordability,
lowering the uninsured rate, and reducing health care costs); Kathleen Sebelius,
Improving the Public’s Health Through the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/blog/2013/09/
improving-public-health.html (discussing the ACA’s “unprecedented resources” devoted to
supporting “community-based strategies to prevent chronic diseases, and to improve
public health”).
17. The
IHI
Triple
Aim,
INST.
FOR
HEALTHCARE
IMPROVEMENT,
http://www.ihi.org/offerings/initiatives/tripleaim/pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 12,
2014).
18. See id. (describing how all three dimensions of the triple aim should be
addressed and how the United States can improve in many areas of health reform by
implementing the triple aim strategy).
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services and products each year.19 A useful—and similarly
shaped—image for Title IV is the fast-food french fry,
symbolizing the mass-marketed, on-demand, high-caloric density,
low-physical-activity lifestyle that has accompanied suburban
sprawl and American demographic and economic change.20
The pen and the french fry constitute the two critical
challenges for health reform beyond health insurance. Given the
complexity of addressing each of these areas, one might think
that the scope and staging of the ACA’s triple ambition would
have been subjected to intense political scrutiny and sustained
public debate. This did not happen. Neither the feasibility nor
the fiscal prudence of making concurrent changes to coverage,
care, and health was ever seriously discussed. Opposition to the
ACA was—and remains—fiercer than one might have anticipated
based on the history of health care regulation. But rather than
pragmatic objections, the passions aroused were strongly
partisan and ideological, and the closest attention was reserved
for supposed features of “Obamacare” that had emotional
resonance, such as “government takeovers” and “death panels.”21
This Commentary acknowledges and applauds efforts to
understand the mechanisms of insurance reform contained in the
ACA and to evaluate their success or failure.22 But the
Commentary’s principal purpose is to examine the pros and cons
of connecting insurance reform to health care and health—the
pen and the french fry—and to convey the importance to the
country of moving beyond insurance reform as quickly as
possible. The Commentary begins by describing the potential
synergies among the three health policy domains and offering
reasons why the ACA sought to make simultaneous changes. It

19. Physicians’ decisions about diagnostic testing, hospitalization, referrals for
other services, medications, and other treatments account for a much larger percentage of
health care spending than their fees alone. Anne B. Martin et al., National Health
Spending in 2012: Rate of Health Spending Growth Remained Low for the Fourth
Consecutive Year, 33 HEALTH AFF. 67, 73–74 (2014).
20. Reid Ewing, Ross C. Brownson & David Berrigan, Relationship Between Urban
Sprawl and Weight of United States Youth, 31 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 464, 470 (2006).
21. Benjamin W. Corn, Ending End-of-Life Phobia—A Prescription for Enlightened
Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e63(1), e63(1)–(2) (2009),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0909740 (discussing the “death panel”
controversy and the fears that fuel it); Frank Luntz, The Language of Healthcare 2009:
The 10 Rules for Stopping the “Washington Takeover” of Healthcare, THINKPROGRESS 1
(2009), http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/frank-luntz-the-language-ofhealthcare-20091.pdf (contending that “[n]othing else turns people against the
government takeover of healthcare than the realistic expectation that it will result in
delayed and potentially even denied treatment, procedures and/or medications”).
22. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the
Beholder, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1029 (2014).
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then identifies the vulnerabilities that are revealed in the Act’s
combined approach. It concludes with a few observations about
ways of improving both health care delivery and health, while
expressing the hope that the ACA’s indisputably sweeping
ambition will not be its downfall.
II. INSURANCE AS THE PATH TO EFFICIENT CARE AND BETTER
HEALTH
When insuring 85% of the U.S. population costs nearly twice
as much per capita as any other country pays to cover its entire
citizenry, adding the remaining 15% to the insurance pool
without ironclad guarantees of cost containment would seem like
a bad bet.23 Heightening this concern is the apparent randomness
of American medicine, in which both the need for particular care
and the quality of the services provided are strikingly variable.24
Otherwise, phrases such as “throwing bad money after good”
come quickly to mind.
Indeed, government health entitlements (Medicare and
Medicaid) already comprise the most rapidly growing category of
federal expenditures, which the United States has been able to
accommodate without large tax increases in recent years only
because of historically low borrowing costs and long-term secular
decreases in military spending.25 State governments, which are
restricted in their ability to incur debt to fund current operations
and have limited tax revenue, have seen Medicaid costs leapfrog
first higher education and then kindergarten through twelfthgrade education.26 The increasing costs are setting up a
destructive competition for public investment not only between
younger and older generations, but between two key
generators—education and health—of “human capital” and
therefore a productive workforce.
In an ominous sign, federal discretionary spending on
everything except national defense has dropped below its
23. DENAVAS-WALT, PROCTOR & SMITH, supra note 9, at 68; HEALTH AT A GLANCE,
supra note 9, at 154–56.
24.
See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, 2012 NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/
findings/nhqrdr/nhdr12/2012nhdr.pdf (focusing on disparities in healthcare between
geographical regions, ethnicities, and socioeconomic groups and cataloging healthcare
inefficiencies that occur when unnecessary treatments are performed).
25. D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34424, TRENDS IN
DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 21 (2014); D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33074, MANDATORY SPENDING SINCE 1962, at 9, 10 fig.2 (2012).
26. See THE STATES PROJECT, THE STATE OF THE STATES REPORT 2012, at 15–16
(2012), available at http://www.thestatesproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/Full_
Report.pdf (remarking on the recent growth in Medicaid spending).
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longtime benchmark range of 3% to 3.5% of GDP, indicating a
potentially serious budgetary strain on government. Nor has the
private sector been spared. Premium increases for private health
coverage, which in the United States is predominantly obtained
through employment, persistently crowd out cash raises in
annual decisions about compensation packages for workers.27 An
aging population with worsening health from rapid rises in
serious chronic conditions such as diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, and cancer accentuates these trends in health care
expenditures.28
Based on these statistics, one would imagine cost control to
be “job one” for health reform, with a stepwise strategy to defer
additional outlays until the current system proved itself capable
of demonstrating its value proposition and restraining its most
inflationary tendencies. At a minimum, it seems that any
increase in publicly funded health insurance coverage would be
made contingent on matching the expense of the health care
systems much more closely to its performance. One might also
reasonably think that any coverage expansion would be
integrated into a long-term plan to improve population health
and moderate the human and financial consequences of chronic
disease.
These characteristics accurately describe the ACA’s
organizational framework, but not its operational details. Why
not? Three categories of explanation present themselves. First,
the ACA adheres closely to an established path for U.S. health
reform called “managed competition” that dates back to the
Nixon Presidency but had its fullest flowering in the Clinton
Administration’s failed Health Security Act.29 Because it is
designed around large prepaid organizations, managed
competition posits that overall costs will be lower if there is
universal or near-universal participation in insured systems.
Second, the ACA largely assumes that the funds currently
circulating in the health care system are not only sufficient to
finance universal coverage but also are more likely to be spent
efficiently if everyone is insured on an equal footing. This
reasoning reflects a belief that inertia in the current system is
27. David I. Auerbach & Arthur L. Kellermann, A Decade of Health Care Cost
Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains for an Average US Family, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1630, 1631 (2011).
28. Thomas Bodenheimer, Ellen Chen & Heather D. Bennett, Confronting the
Growing Burden of Chronic Disease: Can the U.S. Health Care Workforce Do the Job?, 28
HEALTH AFF. 64, 65 (2009).
29. DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND
POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 356–64 (2009).
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primarily the result of uncertainty over funding and that making
implicit commitments and expectations more explicit will
improve performance. Third, and relatedly, the ACA is captive to
its political history both within the Democratic Party and at the
federal level more generally. This history associates reform with
a social safety net for unanticipated risks of hardship, presumes
that demand for services is valid and unmet, and pays little
attention to re-engineering the systems of care that supply those
needs.
A. Managed Competition
“Managed competition” denotes a health care system design
in which the government structures and monitors competition
among private health insurers to deliver covered services at
market prices.30 It is usually contrasted with “single-payer”
systems of national health insurance, in which the government
acts as sole insurer and pays health care providers directly for
covered services, usually at administratively determined rather
than competitive rates.31 Managed competition was first
articulated in the late 1980s by two California health policy
academics, Alain Enthoven and Richard Kronick, who extended
ideas developed for President Nixon’s Comprehensive Health
Insurance Plan, which (unlike the Federal HMO Act of 1973) did
not survive Nixon’s resignation.32
In the early 1990s, managed competition seemed a centrist
alternative to Ted Kennedy’s single-payer liberalism and
therefore became the basis for President Clinton’s Health
Security Act.33 President Obama made a similar political
calculation, thereby importing into the ACA a policy construct
that pursues universal coverage by remaking private insurance
markets more than by extending public insurance programs. The
effect is to entrust the quality and efficiency of care and, to some
30. See David DeGrazia, Single Payer Meets Managed Competition: The Case for
Public Funding and Private Delivery, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 23, 25
(noting that under a managed competition plan the federal government organizes and
manages the insurance system in which insurance companies compete to provide
insurance to individuals).
31. See P. Hussey & G.F. Anderson, A Comparison of Single- and Multi-Payer
Health Insurance Systems and Options for Reform, 66 HEALTH POL’Y 215, 215, 217 (2003)
(explaining that under single-payer systems, the government creates an annual budget to
determine the total amount of health care expenditures).
32. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and
Economy, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29 (1989).
33. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition,
HEALTH AFF., Jan. 1993, at 24, 46.
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extent, even the improvement of health to insurance-based
entities.
1. Competing on Care. Several elements of managed
competition, at least in theory, align coverage with health care
and health. First, much of the management in managed
competition has, as its goal, channeling insurers into competing
on the care they deliver, not the actuarial risk they bear.34 On the
supply side, insurers—as under the ACA—must issue and renew
policies, may not exclude individuals or limit coverage based on
health status, and are limited in their ability to adjust their price
to account for risk.35 Insurers are protected from potentially
adverse consequences of these restrictions by mandatory
participation in the risk pool and by mechanisms to risk-adjust
the payments they receive (rather than the premiums they
charge).36 On the demand side, consumer choice is limited to
plans offering standardized benefits that can be compared based
on cost and measurable quality of care delivered.37 The objective
of these constraints is to encourage thinking about health
insurance as the provision and purchase of prepaid health care
rather than financial protection against large, unexpected losses.
2. Group Purchasing. Active purchasing is the heart of
managed competition, typically by groups rather than
individuals.38 Group insurance is actuarially more predictable,
enabling a focus on care rather than risk and making quality
measurement more statistically meaningful. The ACA’s
insurance “exchanges” and “marketplace” are descended from
Enthoven and Kronick’s health insurance purchasing
cooperatives, which morphed into “health alliances” in the
Clinton Health Security Act, which in turn begat the “connector”
used in the Massachusetts health reform of the mid-2000s.39 The
34. See id. at 25, 29 (stating that under the managed competition model, insurers
are rewarded for improving quality and satisfying patients, not for reducing risk).
35. See id. at 31 (discussing features of managed competition systems).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012) (determining that the individual mandate will
reduce the cost associated with caring for the uninsured); id. § 18061 (providing payments
to health insurers that insure “high risk” individuals).
37. See Enthoven, supra note 33, at 32.
38. See id. at 29 (noting that managed competition must involve active purchasing
agents purchasing plans on behalf of large groups).
39. Id. at 35 (describing health insurance purchasing cooperatives); see
DEMOCRATIC POLICY & COMMC’NS. CTR., THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT: DETAILED SUMMARY, available at http://www.dpc.senate.gov/healthreformbill/
healthbill04.pdf (describing the ACA health exchange); Chelsea Conaboy, Mass. Health
GLOBE
(Jan.
9,
2014),
Connector
Fraught
with
Uncertainty,
BOS.
http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2014/01/09/despite-fixes-some-left-
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concept’s political appeal has depended on terminology and
philosophy; most purchasing pools downplay regulation in favor
of competition and centralized control in favor of mutual
assistance. However, getting a good deal for subscribers still
requires savvy management that can leverage volume to lower
prices and assure quality, much as the largest employers have
been doing for their workers for over twenty years. For this
reason, managed competition has often been associated with
health reform proposals that use an employer mandate to expand
coverage, maintaining reliance on the existing system of
employer-sponsored health insurance.40
3. Taxability of Health Benefits. In addition to group
purchasing leverage, most managed competition proposals have
sought to improve the cost-effectiveness of health care by
eliminating or substantially limiting the federal tax subsidy that
employer-sponsored health coverage has long enjoyed.41 Unlike cash
wages, workers do not pay income tax on the value of health
insurance provided as a fringe benefit of employment, which
currently costs the federal treasury roughly $250 billion annually in
forgone revenue.42 As a result, employers have spent far more on
health insurance, and therefore health care, than would be the case
in an efficient market. The ACA acknowledged this strategy by
declaring money spent by employers on certain “Cadillac health
plans” to be taxable income to workers, but maintained the vast
majority of tax preferences for group health insurance.43
4. Organized Systems of Care. Managed competition is not
synonymous with managed care, but proposals to universalize
private health insurance have generally contemplated a leading role
for “good” managed care organizations that improve the efficiency
and cost-effectiveness of health care delivery.44 It has long been
uncertain-about-connector-health-insurance-coverage/L8gzHXCTV4QiM2CTdiV8JI/
story.html (noting that the Massachusetts connector runs the state’s insurance
marketplace).
40. See, e.g., Enthoven, supra note 33, at 42.
41. See, e.g., Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong. § 7201(b) (1993) (limiting the
federal tax subsidy for employer-sponsored health plans).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012) (excluding employer-provided health care coverage
from gross income); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 6 (2013), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpendi
tures.pdf.
43. Bradley Herring & Lisa Korin Lentz, What Can We Expect from the “Cadillac
Tax” in 2018 and Beyond?, 48 INQUIRY 322, 322–23 (2012).
44. Enthoven, supra note 33, at 37, 41 (providing examples of organized systems of
managed care that are successful and cost-effective).
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appreciated that medical care in the United States is fragmented
and reactive, often neglecting prevention and early treatment in
favor of higher-cost salvage at later stages of disease. In
particular, the American convention of basing care around
community hospitals whose medical staffs are open to
independent private practitioners has created a physician class
with specialized, expensive practice habits, often idiosyncratic
ones, that hospitals have had little incentive or ability to
discourage.45 These failings of health care delivery are thought to
be compounded by traditions of fee-for-service provider
reimbursement, with separate payment streams for health
professionals and for health facilities.46 The positive outliers have
often been large group practices such as the Permanente Medical
Group in California, the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, and the
Geisinger Clinic in Pennsylvania, many of which operate on a
prepaid basis with dedicated facilities as closed-panel health
maintenance organizations (HMOs).47 Organizations of this type
have a predicted advantage under managed competition because
of their emphasis on care coordination, prevention, and timely
treatment, but it has long been assumed that large commercial
health insurers would follow their lead if the incentives were
right.48
5. Community Health Investment. If health insurance
becomes the province mainly of large organizations that compete
on the efficiency of care, the delivery model shifts from individual
health to managing the health of enrolled populations.49 This
transition in mission has become more urgent, and more likely,
because of recent, rapid increases in chronic disease burden.50
The underlying causes of the most common and serious health
45. See id. at 38 (suggesting that the traditional fee-for-service model has left the
current health care system with an excess supply in many specialties).
46. MAURA CALSYN & EMILY OSHIMA LEE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, ALTERNATIVES
TO FEE-FOR-SERVICE PAYMENTS IN HEALTH CARE 1, 6 (2012), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FeeforService4.pdf.
47. Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The
Demographic Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 148, 149 (1993)
(citing the Permanente Medical Group as an example of an efficient competitor); Thomas
H. Lee, Albert Bothe & Glenn D. Steele, How Geisinger Structures Its Physicians’
Compensation to Support Improvements in Quality, Efficiency, and Volume, 31 HEALTH
AFF. 2068, 2068–69 (2012) (describing Geisinger’s successful physician payment program
under a fee-for-service arrangement).
48.
But see Charles N. Kahn III, Payment Reform Alone Will Not Transform Health
Care Delivery, 28 HEALTH AFF. 216, 217 (2009) (supporting the inference that the model
adopted by the Mayo clinic is successful because of its capacity and integration).
49. See Enthoven, supra note 33, at 39 (discussing how organized systems can be
held accountable for their enrolled populations’ prevention of chronic diseases).
50. Bodenheimer, Chen & Bennett, supra note 28, at 65 & exhibit 2, 66.
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conditions such as heart disease, kidney failure, diabetes, and
cancer are predominantly behavioral (e.g., tobacco use, poor diet,
inadequate physical activity), and preventive intervention at the
community level is essential.51 Managed competition models
therefore contemplate insurance organizations investing
substantially in community health improvement, connecting
coverage not only to more efficient care but also to better
underlying health.52
B. Reshuffling Resources
Expanding coverage can help address the problems of the
pen and the french fry through mechanisms additional to
changes in the nature of health insurance associated with
managed competition. These arguments tend to be less wedded to
theories of health system design, and instead they engage
pragmatically with the realities of providing care to people who
cannot afford it, most of whom are currently uninsured. From
this perspective, universal or near-universal coverage will help
rationalize both demand for health care and its supply, enabling
the health care system to reshuffle existing resources to serve
more people at lower cost.53 Implicit in this perspective is the
assumption that U.S. wage earners, taxpayers, and policyholders
are already providing a substantial degree of funding for people
other than themselves and the inference that such money could
be spent more effectively and efficiently.
1. Cost-Shifting. A central premise of the argument that
covering the uninsured will not hugely increase health care costs
is that we are already paying for them in higher insurance
premiums for those with private coverage, which in turn reflect
higher prices charged to insurers by hospitals and physicians.54
According to this reasoning, the charitable impulses and
obligations of health care providers—whether derived from
professional ethics, unfunded government mandates, or the tacit
51. See generally COMM. ON HEALTH & BEHAVIOR, HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR: THE
INTERPLAY OF BIOLOGICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND SOCIETAL INFLUENCES (2001), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK43743/pdf/TOC.pdf.
52. See Enthoven, supra note 33, at 39 (explaining how organized systems under
managed competition “emphasize prevention, early diagnosis and treatment, and effective
management of chronic conditions”).
53. See id. at 41–42 (arguing first that universal coverage is required to make
managed competition work and second that managed competition is the best way to
reduce national health expenditures).
54. See KATHLEEN STOLL & KIM BAILEY, FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX:
AMERICANS PAY A PREMIUM 6 (2009), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/sites/
default/files/product_documents/hidden-health-tax.pdf.
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preference of “society” that the poor not die visibly from treatable
illness—generate bills that must be paid by somebody else, and that
are therefore passed through to paying customers as a share of
overhead. There is more than a little ambiguity, if not illogic, to this
position. Are health care markets so uncompetitive, or demand so
inelastic, that providers with charitable impulses are able to force
consumers to bear the associated costs? What explains the large
sums of money flowing to health care suppliers with few, if any
charitable obligations, such as pharmaceutical companies? Still, it
seems plausible that substantial redistribution of health care
resources occurs implicitly at the provider level, and that increasing
explicit redistribution by expanding formal coverage would serve as
a partial substitute for it.
2. Distorted Prices. The high and seemingly arbitrary level of
provider prices, especially for hospital care, is a very visible
difference between the United States and other developed nations.55
Those other countries also provide universal coverage, which the
United States lacks pending full implementation of the ACA. A
possible connection between the two is that the need for crosssubsidization at the provider level of care for the uninsured distorts
prices compared to what would prevail in a competitive market.56 If
this is true, those distortions—likely highly variable—could
plausibly impair the efficiency of private purchasing decisions.
Distortions in hospital billing may arise not only from the fact of
cross-subsidization, but also from arcane and entrenched pricing
practices necessary to draw revenue from multiple contributing
sources.57 Universalizing coverage could help prices return to
competitive levels, reducing waste and enhancing value for buyers.
3. Expensive Care Settings. It is often observed that
uninsured patients are cared for in ways that are unnecessarily

55. Ezra Klein, 21 Graphs That Show America’s Health-care Prices Are Ludicrous,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 26, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/26/21-graphs-that-show-americas-health-care-prices-areludicrous/; see also Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United
States Is So Different from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2003, at 89, 90, 91
exhibit 1, 92.
56. See STOLL & BAILEY, supra note 54, at 6 (concluding that insurance companies
inflate premiums to recover costs associated with caring for the uninsured). There are, of
course, alternate explanations for international price differentials, including political
mobilization to keep spending down, supply constraints for specialized services and new
technologies, and direct price controls.
57. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, As Hospital Prices Soar, a Stitch Tops $500, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2013, at A1 (attributing distorted and arbitrary hospital care billing to
“little or no price regulation in the private market”).
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costly.58 The poster child for this phenomenon is the emergency
department (ED) of an inner-city hospital, where fees charged to
private pay patients tend to be extraordinarily high.59 Uninsured
patients may seek care in EDs for three reasons: the ED is
legally obligated to care for them regardless of their ability to
pay, they may forgo care because of cost concerns until their
illness is too severe to be treated elsewhere, and there may be
few alternative providers located in the poor neighborhoods
where they live.60 Expanding coverage, therefore, may both
enable demand for lower-cost care settings and increase their
supply. The ED overuse example is salient with the public
because most everyone has been to an ED and thinks of them as
too crowded and too costly, but the potential savings from
reducing ED use by the poor are likely exaggerated, at least in
the short term.61 EDs must remain fully staffed and supplied in
case of unexpected need, so that the marginal cost of treating a
simple problem in the ED is far less than the average cost.62 In
addition, ED bills tend to be particularly inflated so that hospital
charges greatly overstate the real resource cost of emergency
care.63
4. Prevention and Early Treatment. ED overuse is one part
of a broader argument that covering the uninsured will improve
the efficiency of the care they receive. In contrast to critics of
insurance who emphasize the inflationary risks of moral hazard,
universal coverage advocates see insurance as empowering
58. See, e.g., STOLL & BAILEY, supra note 54, at 4–5 (observing that an uninsured
person’s medical condition often becomes exacerbated because medical treatment is
delayed until the condition becomes serious); Enthoven, supra note 33, at 41 (noting that
millions of uninsured Americans often receive care in “costly settings” as opposed to
lower-cost settings like a primary care physician’s office).
59. See Deval Shah-Canning, Joel J. Alpert & Howard Bauchner, Care-Seeking
Patterns of Inner-City Families Using an Emergency Room: A Three-Decade Comparison,
34 MED. CARE 1171, 1172, 1177 (1996) (recognizing that emergency rooms have “fulfilled
a vital role in meeting health-care needs for inner-city families”).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2012) (requiring hospitals to treat any person seeking
emergency medical care, regardless of whether that individual is eligible for health
insurance); STOLL & BAILEY, supra note 54, at 4–5; RENEE M. GINDI, ROBIN A. COHEN &
WHITNEY K. KIRZINGER, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, EMERGENCY ROOM USE AMONG
ADULTS AGED 18–64: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH
INTERVIEW
SURVEY,
JANUARY–JUNE
2011,
at
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/emergency_room_use_january-june_2011.
pdf.
61. See Sarah L. Taubman et al., Medicaid Increases Emergency-Department Use:
Evidence from Oregon’s Health Insurance Experiment, 343 SCIENCE 263, 267–68 (2014).
62. Anil Bamezai, Glenn Melnick & Amar Nawathe, The Cost of an Emergency
Department Visit and Its Relationship to Emergency Department Volume, 45 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 483, 484 (2005).
63. Rosenthal, supra note 57.
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patients to access necessary services on a timely basis.64 They
observe that insurance coverage includes preventive care, often
at no cost to the enrollee, and believe that earlier treatment is
generally cheaper treatment.65 Although expanding the option
set for the currently uninsured should indeed improve the
subjective value they derive from health care, it is not clear how
often prevention or early treatment reduces overall medical
expense.66 For example, cost–benefit analyses of mass screening
tests almost never show net savings.67 To save money, early
interventions should be targeted at high-risk individuals.68 Of
course, preventative services nonetheless may be beneficial to
recipients, and may even be cost-beneficial to society if the
accounting of their benefits extends beyond the health care
domain and the discount rate applied to future savings is not too
high.69
5. Administrative Costs. A point of pride for single-payer
advocates has been the low administrative costs of governmentrun health insurance programs, particularly abroad but also with
respect to Medicare. Risk-selection activities, marketing and
advertising, and profitability are among the avoidable costs often
cited by skeptics of private insurance models.70 Most health
policy experts have concluded that wasteful provision of clinical
care greatly exceeds wasteful insurance administration in the
United States, but the latter is not trivial.71 A transition to a
64. See Douglass Farnsworth, Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Are ConsumerDirected Plans the Answer?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 251, 253–54 (2006) (describing the
existence of moral hazard in the context of health insurance); Proposal of the Physicians’
Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798, 799 (2003)
(advocating for a universal national health insurance program where every American
would be covered for all medically necessary services).
65. See ROSS DEVOL & ARMEN BEDROUSSIAN, MILKEN INST., AN UNHEALTHY
AMERICA: THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF CHRONIC DISEASE 183–85 (2007), available at
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/chronic_disease_report.pdf
(predicting
reduced
expenses and improved productivity as a result of prevention).
66. See generally Louise B. Russell, Preventing Chronic Disease: An Important
Investment, but Don’t Count on Cost Savings, 28 HEALTH AFF. 42 (2009) (suggesting that
prevention adds to medical expenses rather than reducing them).
67. See Joshua T. Cohen, Peter J. Neumann & Milton C. Weinstein, Does Preventive
Care Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 661, 661 (2008).
68. Id.
69. See NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL
PREVENTION STRATEGY 51 (2011) (enumerating the economic benefits of prevention).
70. Id. at 49–50; Susan Adler Channick, Will Americans Embrace Single-Payer
Health Insurance: The Intractable Barriers of Inertia, Free Market, and Culture, 28 LAW &
INEQ. 1, 16 (2010).
71. See INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST 3
(2012), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2012/Best-Care/
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better coordinated program, still administered through private
insurers but channeled into certain activities, was seen by the
ACA’s supporters as having the potential to reduce
administrative expense and increase resources available for the
uninsured. For example, the Act sets minimum levels for
insurers’ “medical loss ratios”—a counterintuitive term that
means the amount of the premium dollar spent on care rather
than profit or administration.72 It also obligates insurers to clear
significantly rising rates with state insurance regulators or the
federal government, presumably to invite scrutiny of the
justifications for those increases.73
6. Labor Markets. Universal health insurance may increase
general economic productivity as well, which is another policy
argument for coverage expansion despite its potential health
care costs. In the long term, one would hope that an insured
population would be healthier, which would reduce
absenteeism and improve workplace performance. These
benefits remain speculative, however. More concretely, tying
insurability to employment in existing private coverage
arrangements results in demonstrable labor market
inefficiencies. An example is “job lock”: individuals who prefer
other jobs may not move because doing so would risk loss of
insurability based on their health or the health of their
dependents.74
C. Politics and Government
Several of the most straightforward explanations for the
Obama Administration’s decision to grapple simultaneously
with coverage expansion, cost control, and health improvement
are political. These include historical path dependence of
various types: partisan, ideological, and structural.75 They also
include more theoretical or conceptual considerations
Best%20Care%20at%20Lower%20Cost_Recs.pdf (recommending continuous improvement
in health care operations to reduce waste and eliminate inefficiencies).
72. Hall, supra note 22, at 1048–49.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94 (2012).
74. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: A Balance Sheet, HEALTH
AFF., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 124, 127; see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Why Do You Care How
Much Other People Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/why-do-you-care-how-much-other-peoplework/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
75. See Simon F. Haeder, Beyond Path Dependence: Explaining Health Care Reform
and Its Consequences, POL’Y STUD. J., Apr. 2012, at 65, 66 (“Many of the explanations of
the historic development of the American healthcare system brought forward by health
policy scholars emphasize the role of path dependence to one degree or another.”).
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regarding the ways in which American government should
influence and assist the provision of health care.76
1. Social Insurance. Universal health coverage has been
perceived as the missing piece of the nation’s social safety net
since the New Deal, and it cannot be coincidental that its longdelayed passage happened just after the United States
experienced an economic downturn second in severity only to
the Great Depression.77 Like the Social Security and Medicare
programs, the ACA and its predecessor health reform efforts
were framed as a collective commitment to protect against
potential hardship—what has been called “us-us” thinking—
rather than an openly redistributive model designed to aid the
less fortunate.78 This immediately categorized the ACA as an
insurance initiative on par with the national health insurance
programs of the social democracies in Canada and Western
Europe, some of which operate through private sickness funds.
2. Lack of Stepwise Alternatives. With the exception of
the Nixon Presidency, health reform has been owned
exclusively by the Democratic Party. Most Republican
administrations have offered symbolic changes at best, and
several have pushed back against existing entitlement
programs in favor of privatization.79 Although partisan rancor
and ideological purism seem particularly rampant these days,
there was no precedent during the ACA debate for a program
that combined serious cost controls with coverage expansions,
except perhaps for the much more limited effort to enact a
Medicare prescription drug benefit under President George W.
Bush.80 This was particularly true because a social insurance
approach required a perception of broad advantage, implying

76.
See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to a Joint Session
of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-JointSession-of-Congress-on-Health-Care) (noting, in introducing the Affordable Care Act,
that the government’s role must be carefully balanced).
77.
See John Holahan, The 2007–09 Recession and Health Insurance Coverage,
30 HEALTH AFF . 145, 146, 152 (2011) (describing the impact of the 2007–2009
recession and encouraging health care reform to create an expanded social safety
net).
78.
Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance:
Fairness, Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare, 25
H EALTH AFF. w114, w117 (2006).
79.
BLUMENTHAL & MORONE, supra note 29, at 19.
80.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071–152 (2003) (setting forth Medicare
prescription drug benefits).
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that existing health insurance benefits could not be very
visibly restricted.81
3. Federal Hammers and Nails. An old saying, often
applied to surgeons during medical training, observes that if all
one has is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. In the U.S.
federal system, the established division of authority over health
care places government insurance programs mainly at the
federal level and regulation of health professions, health
facilities, and public health mainly at the state level.82 There are
exceptions: state regulators monitor private health insurance
(though state authority over employer-based health coverage has
been significantly reduced by the federal ERISA statute), and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversees drugs and
medical technologies.83 In general, however, the federal
government influences the efficiency and effectiveness of health
care services primarily by its approach to paying for services
covered by Medicare and Medicaid. This made it even more
intuitive for the ACA to contemplate health care cost
containment and clinical quality improvement only in the context
of an insurance-based program. An important qualification is
that the ACA’s reliance on individual purchasing from private
carriers in decentralized exchanges makes it harder to regulate
through payment policy, which partially explains why the Act’s
delivery system reform initiatives focus on Medicare.84
4. A National Challenge. Universalizing coverage was a
clear signal that health reform was a national problem requiring
a national solution. The ACA conveyed solidarity, if not
81. See Sam Gutterman, The Nature of Social Insurance Programs and Their Funds,
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, http://www.soa.org/Professional-Interests/Social-Ins/Nature-ofSocial-Insurance-Programs.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (explaining that social
insurance results in coverage of a large part of the population).
82. The most well-known examples of federal insurance programs being Medicare
and Medicaid, created by the Social Security Amendments of 1965. Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (setting forth Medicare provisions in
Title 18 and Medicaid provisions in Title 19).
83. See Carolyn McClanahan, Should States Really Regulate Health Insurance?,
FORBES
(June
19,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolynmcclanahan/2012/
06/19/should-states-really-regulate-health-insurance/ (describing state regulation over
insurance companies); U.S. Food and Drug Administration Home Page, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/default.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014).
84.
See JAMES R. HORNEY & PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, HOUSE-PASSED AND SENATE HEALTH BILLS REDUCE DEFICIT, SLOW HEALTH
CARE COSTS, AND INCLUDE REALISTIC MEDICARE SAVINGS 1, 5 (2009), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-4-09health.pdf (explaining that a large number of the
proposals for restructuring delivery systems underlying the ACA involved Medicare).
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uniformity, primarily through the individual mandate to
purchase insurance with standardized benefits and the
regularization of Medicaid eligibility requirements among
states.85 Considered prospectively from the perspective of the
Obama Administration and the Democratic Congress, these
interventions also may have seemed more familiar and less likely
to provoke controversy than any effort led by the federal
government directly to reduce health care spending, improve the
quality of care, or enhance public health.
III. UNANTICIPATED OBSTACLES TO INSURANCE REFORM
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there was method
in the Obama Administration’s decision to forge ahead with a
major coverage expansion and associated insurance reform in the
ACA notwithstanding the looming disasters of spendthrift health
care and deteriorating health. But there may also have been
madness. Reforming insurance has become much harder than
anticipated, with the expansions of both private and public
coverage that ACA proponents took for granted experiencing
substantial delays and complications. Some of these, such as the
poor performance of the healthcare.gov website in handling
online enrollment, undercut confidence in the competence of
government.86 Others, such as President Obama’s ill-conceived
“promise” that nobody would lose existing coverage, undercut
perceptions of the government’s honesty.87 Furthermore, each
problem the ACA is experiencing now foreshadows even more
difficult battles to come over both health care and health.
It is easy, and largely accurate, to blame the toxic political
climate in which American government currently operates.
Republicans have been obstructionist in ways that would have
been unimaginable for the minority party after the passage of
Medicare in the 1960s.88 But Democrats, and the Obama
Administration in particular, have failed utterly to explain the
goals or contents of the ACA to the public and have let their
opponents define the debate. Missteps in the roll out of the
insurance exchanges, for example, could have been moderated if
not wholly avoided by a better program of communication. As a

85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 18091 (2012).
86. Robert Pear, Sharon LaFraniere & Ian Austen, From the Start, Signs of Trouble
at Health Portal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A1.
87. Michael D. Shear & Robert Pear, Obama in Bind Trying to Keep Health Law
Vow, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at A1.
88. Michael D. Shear, A Rollout’s Stumbles Draw Parallels to Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2013, at A1.
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result, roughly half the states have acted in ways that no
Democrat in Washington, D.C., would have considered rational
when the ACA was passed.89 This, in turn, has greatly increased
the risk that individuals will reject or ignore their obligations
and opportunities under the Act, and that what could easily have
been a decisive victory in the expansion of health coverage will
become a war of attrition.
A. The Supreme Court (National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius)
The ACA’s “With Friends Like These” award goes to the
United States Supreme Court. In a 5–4 decision with Chief
Justice Roberts as the swing vote, the Court in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius upheld the
constitutionality of the ACA, rejecting arguments that its central
provisions exceeded federal authority under Article I.90 In doing
so, however, it made both of the ACA’s major coverage expansion
initiatives “optional,” while failing to credit the Act with any
overarching national purpose, policy logic, or structural
integrity.91
Five conservative justices opined that mandating the private
purchase of insurance was not authorized as regulation of
interstate commerce, but the Chief Justice joined the four more
liberal members to hold that congressional tax power permitted
the government to impose a penalty for not purchasing
insurance.92 Moreover, all of the conservatives emphasized that
89. See State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Marketplaces, 2014, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insuranceexchanges/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (reporting that twenty-seven states have opted not
to create and run their own insurance exchanges); Status of State Action on the Medicaid
Expansion Decision, 2014, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. [hereinafter Status of State
Action on the Medicaid Expansion], http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/stateactivity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2014) (reporting that as of 2014 nineteen states had not yet opted to implement the
Medicaid expansion).
90. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598–600, 2608–09
(2012).
91. See William M. Sage, How Many Justices Does It Take to Change the U.S.
Health System? Only One, But It Has to Want to Change, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–
Oct. 2012, at 27, 28–29 (noting that the Court’s holding renders both the individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion optional).
92. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593, 2600 (demonstrating the
liberal justices’ concurrence with Chief Justice Roberts’s characterization of the mandate
as a tax, but not with his holding that the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power); id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., dissenting) (demonstrating the conservative justices’ concurrence with the holding
that the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power).
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federal overreaching was not only an affront to state sovereignty,
but was also a threat to individual liberty.93 Thus a civic
obligation to participate in a national system of coverage became
merely a modest tax on remaining uninsured.94
With respect to the Act’s other major provision, the Court
ruled 7–2 that it was unconstitutionally coercive for the ACA
to “offer” states the Medicaid expansion on pain of losing all
federal funding if they refused, but again the Chief Justice
anchored a slim majority upholding the provision if only new
funding associated with the expansion were put at risk.95 Thus
the Court declared a generous subsidy to support the working
poor to be an instrument of federal oppression, while
sheltering the “resistance” from even the threat of reprisal.96
Of equal symbolic concern was that all five conservative
justices dismissed the ACA’s policy design, which they
regarded as a politically driven mishmash of subsidies and
requirements.97 Only Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, in which
the four liberals supported the individual mandate on several
constitutional grounds, credited the Act with any inherent
logic or cohesiveness among its sections.98 But even the
concurrence failed to connect the ACA’s insurance reforms
with its delivery system or public health reforms, or to
acknowledge that the law had core purposes beyond expanding
coverage.99

93. Id. at 2578 (majority opinion); id. at 2676–77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
94. See id. at 2608 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is reasonable to construe what Congress
has done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to
go without health insurance. Such legislation is within Congress’s power to tax.”).
95. See id. at 2603–04 (demonstrating Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Kagan’s
finding of unconstitutional coercion); id. at 2643, 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (demonstrating Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito’s
finding of unconstitutional coercion); id. at 2607 (majority opinion) (demonstrating
Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Kagan’s upholding of Congress’s ability to withhold new
Medicaid funds provided by the ACA from noncompliant states); id. at 2630–31, 2642
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (demonstrating Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s agreement that Congress can withhold new Medicaid funds
provided by the ACA from noncompliant states).
96. See id. at 2603–04 (majority opinion) (holding that denial of existing Medicaid
funds to noncompliant states is unconstitutional coercion).
97. See id. at 2591–93 (rejecting the argument that the mandate is an “integral part
of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation” (internal quotation marks omitted));
id. at 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (complaining that
“Congress . . . must take as its point of departure a jumble of now senseless provisions”).
98. See id. at 2609, 2613 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that Congress achieved a “practical, altogether reasonable, solution” in passing
the ACA).
99. See id. at 2609–42.
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The Supreme Court’s lukewarm endorsement of the ACA
emboldened states with conservative leanings to resist
implementing the Act’s insurance provisions.100 Doing so exposed
weaknesses in the ACA’s drafting that cannot presently be
remedied through legislation because the necessary votes are
lacking. Democrats never imagined that states would reject the
Medicaid expansion, which initially would be funded entirely at
federal expense and which would always be more generously
supported from Washington, D.C., than the traditional Medicaid
program.101 Texas, for example, stands to lose at least $70 billion
over a ten-year period, which would finance coverage for over one
million low-income residents who are currently supported by
local resources.102 As a result, the ACA does not offer tax
subsidies for Medicaid-eligible individuals to access the
insurance exchanges in states that refuse the expansion, even
though these individuals earn less than other subsidized
purchasers.103 Yet, as of December 11, 2013, only twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia had decided to expand
Medicaid, while twenty-three states were not doing so and two
states continued to debate the question.104
Similarly, congressional supporters of the ACA assumed that
all states would choose to operate their own insurance exchanges

100. See id. at 2608 (majority opinion) (“As a practical matter . . . States may now
choose to reject the expansion . . . .”); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin
Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 85 (2013) (“In states
that exercise their NFIB Red State Option to not expand adult [Medicaid eligibility], we
have a new healthcare ‘donut hole.’ The poorest adults will still have Medicaid under
current law, but to widely varying levels of eligibility.” (footnote omitted)); Status of State
Action on the Medicaid Expansion, supra note 89 (reporting that as of 2014, nineteen
states had not yet opted to implement the Medicaid expansion).
101. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2665 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that “Congress never dreamed that any State would
refuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid”); CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, STATUS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION AFTER SUPREME COURT RULING 1,
4, (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/status-of-the-ACA-medicaid-expansionafter-supreme-court-ruling.pdf (noting that the federal government currently covers about
57% of all states’ Medicaid spending, but will cover 100% of the costs of expansion during
the first three years and will cover 90% of the costs beginning in 2020).
102. ANNE DUNKELBERG, CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY PRIORITIES, MEDICAID EXPANSION
RESOURCE GUIDE: ALL THE LATEST ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR TEXAS 2 (2013),
available at http://www.forabettertexas.org/images/HC_2013_02_PP_MedicaidExpansion.
pdf; TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, DIAGNOSIS: COST—AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE
FEDERAL HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION’S IMPACT ON TEXAS 21 (2010), available at
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/healthFed/hr3590Cost.pdf.
103. Carter C. Price & Christine Eibner, For States That Opt Out of Medicaid
Expansion: 3.6 Million Fewer Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, 32
HEALTH AFF. 1030, 1035 (2013).
104. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion, supra note 89.
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because it would assure them control, with considerable
flexibility, over the cultures and practices of those
organizations.105 The ACA even provides federal financial
assistance for states to use when establishing their own
exchanges.106 Instead, as of February 15, 2014, only fourteen
states were operating their own exchanges, with seven states
using federal–state partnerships and thirty-six states (including
Texas) deferring entirely to federal facilitation, which was
included in the ACA only as a backstop.107 This unanticipated
burden on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to
organize and broker health insurance enrollment in much of the
United States is one of the reasons why the federal website has
experienced so many difficulties.108 Moreover, opponents of
federal health reform have argued that the law’s text does not
permit the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to administer tax
subsidies for federally facilitated exchanges.109
B. Choice and Liberty
As the Supreme Court’s decision presaged, the ACA’s
insurance reforms have encountered a surprising degree of
resistance based on perceived tensions between constrained
choice and personal liberty.110 The American medical profession
105. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2665 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“If Congress had thought that States might actually refuse to go
along with the expansion of Medicaid, Congress would surely have devised a backup
scheme so that the most vulnerable groups in our society, that those previously eligible
for Medicaid, would not be left out in the cold. But nowhere in the 900-page Act is such a
scheme to be found.”); see also David K. Jones, Katharine W.V. Bradley & Jonathan
Oberlander, Pascal’s Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the
Republican Dilemma, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 97, 99, 111 (2014) (noting that fortyeight states initially applied for an exchange planning grant and that health insurance
exchanges were seemingly uncontroversial, as they allowed states “the flexibility to
determine their structure, governance, and level of regulation”).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 18043 (2012).
107. State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-actionsto-implement-the-health-benefit.aspx.
108. See Roberta Rampton, Days Before Launch, Obamacare Website Failed to
Handle Even 500 Users, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/
22/us-usa-healthcare-website-idUSBRE9AL03K20131122.
109. Complaint at 12–13, Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-0623 (PLF), 2013 WL 5786889
(D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2013); Brief of Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs at 3–10, Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-0623 (PLF), 2013
WL 5786889 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2013).
110. Robert E. Moffit, Obamacare and the Individual Mandate: Violating Personal
Liberty and Federalism, WEBMEMO (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 18, 2011,
at 5, 5–6, available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3103.pdf (citing
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated,
656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011)).
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has long promoted free choice by patient of physician and by
physician of patient as a bedrock principle of health policy.111 In
the 1990s, insurance industry opponents of the Clinton
Administration’s reform proposal successfully transferred public
angst over choosing one’s doctor to choosing one’s insurer as well,
probably because the latter was seen as a proxy for the former.112
This rhetoric has escalated in debates over implementing the
ACA. It has also been given a constitutional gloss that it
previously lacked, most clearly in challenges to the ACA from
both individuals and corporations who claim that the mandatory
inclusion of contraceptive services in the standardized benefit
packages infringes their religious liberties.113
In retrospect, the centrality of concerns over personal
liberty, in coverage as well as care, is attributable at least in part
to the Obama Administration’s decision to construct the ACA
around an individual mandate to purchase insurance, with the
employer mandate to offer coverage that had been foremost in
earlier reform proposals relegated to a backstopping role.114
Placing the principal onus on individuals rather than employers
reduced the ACA’s vulnerability to chamber of commerce
arguments about economic burden and job loss, but enhanced the
impact of libertarian rhetoric as government-imposed incentives,
requirements, and restrictions became more visible to the public,
rather than being largely shielded from view by employer
intermediation. As a practical matter, the shift from employed
groups to individual enrollment—even though most private
111. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 23–24
(1982) (discussing ideal market conditions that allowed sellers and buyers to choose freely
without being forced to accept certain terms, and the medical profession’s attempt to
control market forces); Charles D. Weller, “Free Choice” as a Restraint of Trade in
American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1358–59 (1984)
(explaining the prior American structure of health care delivery as market free choice
plans that allowed for consumers to choose providers based on price and nonprice
considerations).
112. See generally Raymond L. Goldsteen et al., Harry and Louise and Health Care
Reform: Romancing Public Opinion, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1325 (2001) (analyzing
the Health Insurance Association of America’s campaign against the Clinton
Administration’s health care reform proposal).
113. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d and remanded, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013); see also Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D.
Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
114. The ACA provides an individual mandate that requires “applicable
individual[s]” to obtain health insurance by 2014 or otherwise become subject to a tax
penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(c) (2012). Though the focus is on the individual mandate,
the ACA lists both individual and employer responsibilities. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A
(outlining the various requirements relating to the individual mandate); 29 U.S.C. § 218a
(describing automatic enrollment for employees of large employers).
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coverage will still be accessed through the workplace over the
next few years—also increased the risk that adverse selection
will compromise the viability of the insurance exchanges if
healthier individuals decide to pay a modest tax instead of
enrolling.115
The
individual
mandate
intensified
the
Obama
Administration’s need to reassure the public that the ACA would
facilitate future choices and not compromise past ones with
which people are satisfied. Economists disagree about the
prevalence of “loss aversion,” but resistance to change is a
natural phenomenon in government and politics.116 Because trust
is an essential aspect of medical care, moreover, the process of
receiving treatment often converges with the outcome of that
treatment in patients’ perception of quality.117 This makes health
care particularly susceptible to wishful thinking and the Lake
Wobegon syndrome, in which nearly all patients come to regard
their own care arrangements as significantly above average.118
With respect to the ACA’s insurance reforms, it also painted the
administration into a corner. The President promised that
individuals could keep their existing coverage if they wished, but
he could not control the decisions of insurers to continue to offer
that coverage in a competitive marketplace.119
Privacy—being unmonitored by the government and
unrevealed to others without one’s consent—is another important
aspect of the libertarian’s prized right to be left alone. The
coverage expansion necessarily entails the collection and sharing
115. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE & JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, CBO AND JCT’S
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE
OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 4 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-15-ACA_and_Insurance_2.
pdf (describing the decrease in employer-based health insurance coverage); NAT’L ASS’N
OF INS. COMM’RS, ADVERSE SELECTION ISSUES AND HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES
UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2011), available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/
ASE-OP.pdf (explaining how employer-based health insurance coverage minimizes the
risks of adverse selection).
116. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 24–25 (W.K. Marriott trans., Constitution
Society 1908) (1515) (“And it ought to be remembered and there is nothing more difficult
to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take
the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.”).
117. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 949 (1963) (explaining that, in medical care, the product and the
activity of production are identical and contain an essential element of trust).
118. DAVID DRANOVE, CODE RED 91 (2008); SANDRA WILDE, TESTING AND STANDARDS
45 (2002).
119. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Annual Conference
of The American Medical Association (June 15, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-annual-conferenceamerican-medical-association).
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of considerable personal information, and breaches of data
security are an ever-present risk. Early security audits of the
healthcare.gov website have not been reassuring. Nor is the
public particularly comfortable with the ACA’s obligation to
convey personal information to insurers, who are generally
mistrusted even though their incentives to exploit information
for corporate gain are considerably attenuated by the ACA’s
restrictions on medical underwriting and pricing-to-risk.120
Perceptions of threats to privacy are worsened by the
involvement of the IRS in enrollment processes involving the
insurance exchanges. Though necessary to administer subsidies
for low-income individuals and families, IRS participation both
adds another party traditionally regarded with hostility to those
with potential access to personal health information and subjects
sensitive financial data to the risk of compromise. Suspicions
created in connection with the ACA’s coverage expansion
therefore may be heightened if and when more private
information is sought to improve the efficiency of health care
delivery or the improvement of underlying health.
That the public has been so sensitized to issues of choice and
liberty as the ACA’s coverage expansion is implemented does not
bode well for the critical conversations that will be necessary to
reduce wasteful care and improve underlying health. Allegations
of rationing, “death panels,” and the “nanny state” lurk around
every corner, and virtually nothing has been done to educate the
public about the strategies that insurers and providers will need
to adopt as delivery system reform proceeds.121 Media exposure of
hospital overpricing has resurfaced, supplementing the staple
criticisms of greedy insurers and drug companies.122 But the
120. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.320 (2012) (authorizing the disclosure of protected health
information).
121. See Paul Hsieh, Op-Ed, The Dangerous Synergy Between the Nanny State and
Universal Health Care, FORBES (June 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/
2012/06/18/the-dangerous-synergy-between-the-nanny-state-and-universal-health-care/;
Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: April 2013, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-april-2013/; Neil
Macdonald, The Nanny-State Lie Behind Obamacare, CBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-nanny-state-lie-behind-obamacare-1.2325696;
Peter
Ubel, Why It Is So Difficult to Kill the Death Panel Myth, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/01/09/why-it-is-so-difficult-to-kill-the-deathpanel-myth/.
122. The public rejected the Clinton Administration’s healthcare reform proposal in
the early ‘90s. James P. Pfiffner, President Clinton’s Health Care Reform Proposals of
1994, in TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 69, 70–71 (David
Abshire ed., 2001). See generally HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF 1, 3, 5 (2012),
available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_
78.pdf (discussing the evolution of managed care and the emphasis on quality and pay-forperformance features); What Is ObamaCare/What Is Health Care Reform?, OBAMACARE
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political classes have yet to grapple with the realities of managed
care as it has evolved from the restrictive version that was
soundly (if perhaps unwisely) rejected by the public in the 1990s
to its current incarnation as a physician-led, patient-centered
project
that
emphasizes
quality
measurement,
price
transparency, and pay-for-performance.123 The phrase “managed
care” is hard to find in ACA guidance—it is nearly absent from
the healthcare.gov website—and it is seldom to be heard in
health policy debates even when discussion turns to delivery
system reform ideas such as Accountable Care Organizations
that are its direct descendants.
C. Fairness and Redistribution
Central to a social insurance model for health reform is to
conceptualize universal coverage as a collective investment in
mutual assistance rather than a compelled transfer of resources
from the better-off to the less fortunate. The existing Medicare
program meets this condition only because aging is inevitable,
and today’s contributors will be tomorrow’s beneficiaries (at least
in theory). With respect to private coverage, all of the currently
insured participate willingly in some risk pool—typically the
workforce of a common employer—within which redistribution
occurs. Workers and their families are not similarly situated in
terms of health risks and do not know one another personally
except in small workplaces, but accept their shared
circumstances as natural and desirable. The ACA’s insurance
reforms seek to replicate this acceptance on a national scale.
At present, some of the loudest objections to the fairness of
the ACA’s insurance reforms are being voiced by a small number
of participants in existing individual insurance markets who feel
that they have made prudent decisions to buy less coverage than
the new law requires, and who now find those policies being
cancelled by the insurers as ACA noncompliant.124 Many of these
FACTS, http://www.obamacarefacts.com/whatis-obamacare.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2014)
(explaining the features and goals of the Affordable Care Act).
123. See Sticker Shock: Investigating the High Costs of Hospital Bills, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2013, 7:30 PM), http://www.abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2013/11/20/stickershock-investigating-the-high-costs-of-hospital-bills/.
124. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha & Lena H. Sun, For Consumers Whose Health
Premiums Will Go Up Under New Law, Sticker Shock Leads to Anger, WASH. POST (Nov.
3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/for-consumers-whosehealth-premiums-will-go-up-under-new-law-sticker-shock-leads-to-anger/2013/11/03/
d858dd28-44a9-11e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.html (discussing criticisms and providing
examples of those who purchased individual insurance and were subsequently forced to
pay more for unwanted services as a result of the ACA); Avik Roy, Obama Officials in
2010: 93 Million Americans Will Be Unable to Keep Their Health Plans Under
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individuals espouse conservative political views and have more
confidence in markets than in government. They object not only
to losing their own desired coverage, but also to subsidizing
insurance for others who, in their view, may be prone to moral
hazard and tempted to overuse or waste resources.
The key health policy question is whether the higherdeductible coverage that is being lost is worth preserving,
particularly considering that the ACA’s insurability strategy
depends on healthier and less healthy people sharing the same
risk pools. Proponents of high-deductible policies sometimes
conflate a consumer’s individually rational economic response to
rapidly rising costs for more complete coverage with the lessthan-transparent sale of an inadequate product to people who
may not notice the inadequacy until it is too late.125 Which is a
more accurate depiction of high-deductible coverage depends on
context; there is no clean line dividing policies that offer lower
premiums and incentivize policyholders to spend prudently on
care from policies that exploit people’s tendency to ignore or
underestimate unpleasant contingencies.126 The ACA’s standards
for acceptable coverage are therefore negotiable, particularly
with respect to deductibles and cost sharing, and should be
adjusted if needed to preserve the public’s sense of overall
fairness.
Resistance to redistribution has also been reflected in the
reaction to the ACA’s tax provisions. Taxes can be used as policy
instruments both to raise revenue and to change behavior, and
the ACA contains a mix of taxation strategies.127 However, the
American public tends to resist tax increases as unfair regardless
of purpose, and U.S. politicians will seldom support them. As

Obamacare, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/
10/31/obama-officials-in-2010-93-million-americans-will-be-unable-to-keep-their-healthplans-under-obamacare/ (noting that 40%–67% of individually purchased insurance plans
will lose their grandfather status and become illegal, forcing insurers to offer services that
are neither demanded nor needed).
125. See James R. Knickman, The Downside of High-Deductible Health Plans,
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamesr-knickman/the-downside-of-highdeduc_b_4079460.html (explaining the benefits and
pitfalls of high-deductible health plans to include encouraging consumer consciousness in
healthcare spending but also risking consumers forgoing needed care).
126. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: POTENTIAL
EFFECTS ON HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND OUTCOMES 1, 45, 52 (2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7700/12-21-healthplans.pdf.
127. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596–97, 2600 (2012)
(explaining that the ACA tax will not only raise revenue but will also affect individual
conduct); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of
the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1204–06 (2012) (explaining how methods to promote
general welfare may involve regulatory means, including taxes).
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noted above, the ACA boosted the taxability of employersponsored health benefits only minimally, essentially punting on
an intervention widely supported by health policy experts that
would have both raised revenue and inserted a modicum of costconsciousness into insurance design. Continuing controversy over
the insurance expansion has eroded any political cover for
taxation that its supporters might have enjoyed; for example, the
ACA’s tax on medical devices (which are substantially overpriced
and overused) is under attack and may soon be repealed.128 This
antipathy is likely to carry over to tax strategies that might be
proposed to improve health, such as surcharges on unhealthy
behaviors, even though the Supreme Court’s holding affirmed the
permissibility of such an approach as a constitutional matter.129
The worst casualty of contentious insurance reform is any
nascent sense of social solidarity around health care and health
that the passage of the ACA might have nurtured. In other
developed countries, health solidarity is an important social
value that not only maintains support for universal coverage, but
it also enables the polity to resist special interests whose
demands for resources, if satisfied, would threaten the system’s
sustainability for the general population. The British, for
example, act collectively as voters to restrain the potential for
excessive spending in the National Health Service in part
because they realize that, as patients, it is hard to restrain their
impulse to have the system spend too much.130 The United States
has never bred a collective politics of health care capable of
reining in special interests, as our high health care spending
attests.131 Among other things, there is little political
mobilization to refute the common misperception, routinely
encouraged by special interests, that employment growth in the
health care sector is good for the general economy.132
128. See Devin Leonard, Why the Medical Device Tax Came to Rule the Debt-Ceiling
Talks, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-1015/why-the-medical-device-tax-came-to-rule-the-debt-ceiling-talks (explaining how the
repeal of a tax on medical devices was one of the conditions for ending the government
standoff).
129. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (recognizing the
constitutionality of taxes levied on items such as cigarettes, marijuana, and sawed-off
shotguns to encourage healthier behavior).
130. See Leonard J. Nelson, III, Rationing Health Care in Britain and the United
States, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 175, 189–90 (2011) (discussing budgetary
limitations set on the National Health Service by the parliamentary system, which is
accountable to British voters).
131. Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb.
1999, at 22, 23, 26–27.
132. Compare TRIPP UMBACH, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
AAMC-MEMBER MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND TEACHING HOSPITALS 1 (2012), available at
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The ACA did little to fill this gap. An astonishing omission is
any common descriptor attached to coverage under the Act—
comparable to “Medicare” or the names that states have used to
build support for their Medicaid programs—that might have
instilled at least a limited sense of “in-this-togetherness.”133 In
other writing, I have suggested “Americare.”134 The ACA’s
expansion of private coverage has since acquired a name, but a
divisive rather than a unifying one: “Obamacare.” It is doubtful
that solidarity will emerge around reducing wasteful health care
spending or improving collective health if the ACA’s program of
universal coverage has bred so much sectarianism.
IV. CONCLUSION: GETTING TO HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH
If the United States cannot stop wasting $1 trillion each
year on ineffective, sometimes harmful health care, we will go
broke.135 If we cannot become a healthier nation, earning more at
work and spending less on care, we will go broke. Neither
problem has easy solutions, and much of the nation remains
ignorant or in denial of the scope and scale of the challenges.
The well-trained and well-meaning health professionals,
superbly equipped health care facilities, and advanced medical
therapies we depend on for care are embedded in a system that is
rife with waste and inefficiency. It is hard to refute the argument
that what the U.S. health care system does best is bill for
services and invent new services for which it can bill. We cannot,
and should not, render the system noncommercial, but we most
certainly can remake the competition and innovation that health
https://www.members.aamc.org/eweb/upload/The%20Economic%20Impact%20of%20AAM
C%20Member%20Medical%20Schools%20and%20Teaching%20Hospitals_2012.pdf
(“During 2011, the combined economic impact of [academic health centers] totaled more
than $587 billion. AAMC members accounted for nearly 3.5 million full-time jobs,
meaning that one in every 40 wage earners in the U.S. labor force works either directly or
indirectly for an AAMC-member institution. This is an increase in economic impact of
nearly 15 percent from 2009.”), with Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Health
Care Jobs Fallacy, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2433, 2433 (2012) (“It is tempting to think that
rising health care employment is a boon, but if the same outcomes can be achieved with
lower employment and fewer resources, that leaves extra money to devote to other
important public and private priorities such as education, infrastructure, food, shelter,
and retirement savings.”).
133. William M. Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, but Still American, in CONNECTING
AMERICAN VALUES WITH AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFORM 10, 10–12 (Thomas H. Murray
& Mary Crowley eds., 2009).
134.
William M. Sage, Why the Affordable Care Act Needs a Better Name:
‘Americare,’ 29 H EALTH AFF. 1496, 1496–97 (2010).
135.
P RICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS’ H EALTH RESEARCH INST., THE P RICE OF
EXCESS: IDENTIFYING W ASTE IN H EALTHCARE SPENDING 5–6 (2008), available at
https://www.pwc.com/cz/en/verejna-sprava-zdravotnictvi/prices-of-excess-healthcarespending.pdf.
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care markets generate. Done well, health care will become
quicker, cheaper, and more reliable, the same standards we
apply to products and services throughout the economy.
Getting there will require changing what we pay for and how
we pay, letting information circulate as we would in other areas
of commerce, and reducing regulatory and professional barriers
that constrain both imagination and performance. Prices, now
both high and arbitrary, must be anchored in economic reality in
order to induce productive efficiency. Equally important is to get
the product right. The units and bundles of health care that we
purchase should do us measurable and intuitive good, rather
than represent meaningless quanta set by professional habit and
unthinkingly packaged into insurance policies.
Improving health is equally important. Medical care is a
relatively small determinant of health, but a very expensive one.
With the recent upswing in chronic disease burden, clinical
medicine has regained an awareness of population health that
had eluded it in the decades since antibiotics and vaccination
reduced public vulnerability to infectious disease.136 This is a
favorable development, but one that must be accompanied by
explicit attention to the social determinants of health that are
not within the control or authority of the medical profession.
Building a virtuous cycle between educational gains and health
improvement should be a priority. Although state governments
struggle with the competing budgetary demands of health and
education, it has been well documented that healthy children
learn more effectively, and that better educated people are
healthier later in life.137
The caricatured liberal looks primarily to collective policies
and processes to improve health, while the caricatured
conservative relies mainly on individuals taking personal
responsibility. This is a false dichotomy. Solid empirical evidence
suggests that both contributions are essential: the best-designed
community will not improve health if people lack self-discipline,
and the most self-reliant person will fail to stay healthy if
everything in the community pulls in the other direction.138 It is

136. See Bodenheimer, Chen & Bennett, supra note 28, at 64, 68; Derek Yach et al.,
The Global Burden of Chronic Diseases, 291 JAMA 2616, 2620 (2004).
137. SUSAN H. LANDRY, EFFECTIVE EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS 21, 28, 30 (2005),
available at http://www.childrenslearninginstitute.org/library/publications/documents/
Effective-Early_Childhood-Programs.pdf.
138. Kelly D. Brownell et al., Personal Responsibility and Obesity: A Constructive
Approach to a Controversial Issue, 29 HEALTH AFF. 379, 382–83 (2010); Boyd A. Swinburn
et al., The Global Obesity Pandemic: Shaped by Global Drivers and Local Environments,
378 LANCET 804, 809–10 (2011).
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also critical to recognize that health can be maintained and
improved though private, entrepreneurial activity as well as
through government fiat and funding, as the recent expansion of
mobile health apps demonstrates.139 This “upstream” health
sector—services delivered to people who are living their daily
lives rather than people who have been plucked from those lives
and labeled “patients”—can be both innovative and lucrative, but
it will not develop as long as we continue to pour unlimited funds
into the “downstream” sector of services delivered in traditional
acute care settings.
The skills required to move us in the right direction are
familiar
ones:
communication,
negotiation,
and
the
determination to do things differently. The ACA lays out a
constructive path, but we will not travel very far along it until we
stop arguing about insurance reform and put the coverage
expansion behind us.

139. William H. Frist, Connected Health and the Rise of the Patient-Consumer, 33
HEALTH AFF. 191, 192 (2014); Y. Tony Yang & Ross D. Silverman, Mobile Health
Applications: The Patchwork of Legal and Liability Issues Suggests Strategies to Improve
Oversight, 33 HEALTH AFF. 222, 223 (2014).

